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Abstract
Has the global economic crisis resulted in countries shifting their exchange
rate regimes and, if so, in what way? Focusing on the relevant period of
2008-12, and using the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and
Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) classification of exchange rate regimes and
database, we calculate exchange rate regime transition probabilities and test
their statistical significance. Even though there is some evidence of state de-
pendence, in the sense that transitions are relatively infrequent, we do find
that these are significant, especially in the direction of fixity. Our testing
procedure employs the Wilson (1927) statistic, which is appropriate for draw-
ing inference based on relatively rare events. By examining all transitions in
detail, we also find further evidence that countries that shift often flip back
to their previous regime.
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1 Introduction
There is considerable evidence that exchange rate regimes exhibit a high degree
of state dependence (von Hagen and Zhou, 2007). Studies of regime transitions
based on conventional optimum currency area criteria report results that leave much
unexplained, and the models have low predictive power (Masson and Ruge-Murcia,
2005). Investigation of exchange rate regime dynamics confirms that there generally
appears to be a low probability of regimes shifting. Where they do, there is a
tendency for some countries to flip back to the initial regime, with the flipping
often, but not exclusively, being back to a fixed rate regime (Klein and Shambaugh,
2008).
Has the enhanced international economic turbulence in the aftermath of the
global crisis in 2008/09 led to a change in this pattern? Faced with severe depar-
tures from internal/external balance, governments have modified fiscal policy and
monetary policy, but have they also shifted their preferred exchange rate regime,
and, if so, in what direction and for how long?
The relevant theoretical priors are ambiguous. Larger macroeconomic disequilib-
ria seem likely to be associated with a greater probability of policy change. But this
does not necessarily imply a shift in exchange rate regime. The value of a currency
may, of course, change under an unchanged flexible exchange rate regime. More-
over, the real exchange rate may change even under a fixed nominal rate regime.
Where shifts in exchange rate regimes are countenanced, there are theoretical ar-
guments that can be used to support shifts in either direction depending on the
circumstances. A shift towards a more flexible regime may become more attractive
for countries with balance of payments deficits as a way of inducing the economic
adjustment needed to bring about full internal and external balance. It may become
more attractive to surplus countries because of the counter-inflationary properties
of currency appreciation.
A shift towards greater fixity may become more attractive for deficit countries
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as a commitment device for disciplining the conduct of macroeconomic policy and
anchoring inflationary expectations. For surplus countries it may become more
attractive as a way of offsetting a loss of international competitiveness that would
be associated with currency appreciation that might in turn, and for example, be
linked to a sharp increase in capital inflows. In addition, and particularly in these
circumstances, governments may, in principle, use capital controls as a short term
policy instrument. However, it appears that historically and with a few exceptions,
they have not used them in this way (Eichengreen and Rose, 2014).
Focusing on the period 2008-12, and using the Annual Report on Exchange Ar-
rangements and Exchange Restrictions (International Monetary Fund, 2013) classi-
fication of exchange rate regimes and database, we calculate exchange rate regime
transition probabilities. We set out to discover whether there have been significant
shifts in exchange rate regimes and what form they have taken.
2 Methods and Results
We define a transition as the shift from one exchange rate regime to another and
distinguish between two main types of regime: flexible and inflexible. The for-
mer includes crawling pegs, crawl-like arrangements, pegged exchange rates within
horizontal bands, floating and free-floating exchange rates; the latter includes the
category of no separate legal tender, as well as currency boards, conventional pegs
and stabilised arrangements.1 There is a third group, which contains all other man-
aged arrangements.2 The probability distribution of exchange rate regimes for the
period 2008–12 is shown in Figure 1. The flexible exchange rate regime appears
slightly more frequently than the inflexible one (45.2% vs 43.8%, respectively).
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
1For detailed definitions of the IMF’s exchange rate arrangements see Kokenyne et al. (2009).
2This is a residual, and, hence, less interesting group—the IMF includes all observations that
could not be classified into any of the other exchange rate arrangements.
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During the same period, there have been a total of 68 transitions (including
moves to and from other managed arrangements) in the sample of 748 observations—
evidence of relative state dependence. As can be seen in Figure 2, most of these
transitions occurred in the beginning of the sample. The probability pk,l with which
a transition takes place from a regime k to a regime l can be calculated as pk,l =
nk,l/Nk, where nk,l is the number of transitions from regime k to regime l and Nk is
the total number of transitions away from regime k.
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Table 1 reports all transition probabilities along with the frequency of each tran-
sition. There have been 15 transitions from inflexible towards flexible regimes cor-
responding to 65.2% of all transitions away from inflexible regimes. There have
been 15 transitions from flexible towards inflexible regimes representing 60% of all
transitions away from flexible regimes. All such instances are reported in Table 2.
Following a transition, several countries ‘flip’ back to the original regime.
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Assuming that transition probabilities follow a binomial distribution, we wish to
estimate suitable confidence intervals in order to gauge the reliability of the transi-
tion probability estimates.3 First, we need to ‘correct’ the transition probabilities
reported in Table 1 so that we can use them in the construction of Wilson con-
fidence intervals.4 Given the assumption of binomial distribution, these are more
appropriate than simpler Wald interval estimations (Brown et al., 2001).5
3The binomial assumption is appropriate, as the potential outcome of each transition, say from
k, is binary: there is either a shift towards a given regime, say l with probability pk,l, or towards
the remaining regime with probability 1− pk,l.
4See Wilson (1927).
5For example, under the binomial distribution, a Wald confidence interval may assume negative
values, as is the case here when we consider transitions from other managed arrangements to
flexible regimes at the 1% confidence level. A disadvantage of the Wilson transition probabilities
is that they may not necessarily add up to 100%.
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The transition probability from regime k to regime l using the Wilson statistic
is:
pWk,l =
nk,l +
z2
α/2
2
Nk + z2α/2
, (1)
where zα/2 is the upper confidence limit (two-tailed) for the standard normal. The
Wilson confidence (‘score’) interval is
pWk,l ± ck,l, (2)
where
ck,l =
zα/2
√
Nk
Nk + z2α/2
√
pWk,l
(
1− pWk,l
)
+
z2α/2
4Nk
. (3)
If transitions do not depend on the originating state k, then the number of
transitions from k to l is insignificant. This is the null hypothesis. Under the null
hypothesis, the transition probability can be calculated by dividing the number of
realisations of regime l by the number of realisations of all regimes except k. We label
this pnullk,l to avoid confusion with pk,l. If p
null
k,l does not fall within the Wilson score
interval, then the null is rejected and the number of transitions nk,l is statistically
significant at the chosen level.6 Results for all transitions are reported in Table 3.
Transitions from flexible to inflexible regime are significant at the 1% level, whereas
transitions in the opposite direction are significant at the 10% level.
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
3 Conclusions
The main conclusions that emerge from our analysis are as follows. First, countries
in general do not tend to alter their exchange rate regimes even when confronted with
relatively severe economic circumstances. State dependence has continued to be an
important feature of the choice of regime in the aftermath of the global economic
6This procedure is consistent with Beaver et al. (2008).
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crisis. For many countries, the best single predictor of a country’s future exchange
regime seems to be its most recent one. An exception is a relatively small group of
developing countries where there have been significant changes in regime.
Second, and for this group of countries, there have been transitions both towards
greater fixity and greater flexibility. However, in the period 2008-12, the more
significant shift has been towards greater fixity.
Third, of the countries that shifted their exchange rate regime, about half shifted
back to their original regime within a year or two. The period 2008-12 therefore
provides further evidence of regime flipping.
Fourth, assuming that each case is not individually unique, the challenge is to
provide a convincing general model of transitions in exchange rate regime. However,
specific individual circumstances are likely to remain important. In our sample, for
example, Estonia’s shift to floating was associated with joining the Eurozone, and
this had relatively little to do with the particular economic environment associated
with the global crisis.
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Table 1: Frequencies and Transition Probabilities (%)
freq & prob To: inflexible To: fexible To: other Total
From: inflexible
freq. — 15 8 23
prob. — 65.2 34.8 100.0
From: flexible
freq. 15 — 10 25
prob. 60.0 — 40.0 100.0
From: other
freq. 16 4 — 20
prob. 80.0 20.0 — 100.0
Total
freq. 31 19 18 68
prob. 45.6 27.9 26.5 100.0
Notes. Authors’ calculations. Data source: AREAER.
Table 2: Transitions by Country
Year Country From regime To regime
Transitions to a less flexible regime
2012 Georgia III.C.9. Floating III.C.4. Stabilized arrng.
2012 Bolivia* III.C.5. Crawling peg III.C.4. Stabilized arrng.
2011 Guatemala* III.C.9. Floating III.C.4. Stabilized arrng.
2011 Egypt* III.C.6. Crawl-like arrng. III.C.4. Stabilized arrng.
2010 Belarus III.C.7. Horizontal bands III.C.4. Stabilized arrng.
2010 Pakistan* III.C.9. Floating III.C.4. Stabilized arrng.
2010 Indonesia* III.C.9. Floating III.C.4. Stabilized arrng.
2009 Syria III.C.7. Horizontal bands III.C.4. Stabilized arrng.
2009 Burundi III.C.9. Floating III.C.4. Stabilized arrng.
2009 Tunisia* III.C.9. Floating III.C.4. Stabilized arrng.
2009 Cambodia III.C.9. Floating III.C.4. Stabilized arrng.
2009 Jamaica* III.C.9. Floating III.C.4. Stabilized arrng.
2009 Iraq III.C.5. Crawling peg III.C.4. Stabilized arrng.
2009 Bolivia* III.C.5. Crawling peg III.C.4. Stabilized arrng.
2009 Sri Lanka* III.C.9. Floating III.C.4. Stabilized arrng.
Transitions to a more flexible regime
2012 Guatemala* III.C.4 Stabilized arrng. III.C.9. Floating
2012 Egypt* III.C.4 Stabilized arrng. III.C.6. Crawl-like arrng.
2011 Honduras III.C.4 Stabilized arrng. III.C.6. Crawl-like arrng.
2011 Jamaica* III.C.4 Stabilized arrng. III.C.6. Crawl-like arrng.
2011 Tunisia* III.C.4 Stabilized arrng. III.C.6. Crawl-like arrng.
2011 Indonesia* III.C.4 Stabilized arrng. III.C.9. Floating
2011 Pakistan* III.C.4 Stabilized arrng. III.C.9. Floating
2011 Bolivia* III.C.4 Stabilized arrng. III.C.5. Crawling peg
2010 China III.C.4 Stabilized arrng. III.C.6. Crawl-like arrng.
2010 Dominican Rep III.C.4 Stabilized arrng. III.C.6. Crawl-like arrng.
2010 Bangladesh III.C.4 Stabilized arrng. III.C.6. Crawl-like arrng.
2010 Estonia III.C.2 Currency board III.C.10. Free floating
2010 Rwanda III.C.4 Stabilized arrng. III.C.6. Crawl-like arrng.
2010 Croatia III.C.4 Stabilized arrng. III.C.6. Crawl-like arrng.
2010 Sri Lanka* III.C.4 Stabilized arrng. III.C.6. Crawl-like arrng.
Notes. An asterisk indicates a country that went back to the original regime
following a transition (a ‘flipper’). Data source: AREAER.
Table 3: Wilson Transition Probabilities (%)
To: inflexible To: fexible To: other
From: inflexible — 61.8* 34.8*
From: fexible 57.9*** — 42.1***
From: other 72.5** 27.5** —
Notes. One asterisk denotes significance at the 10% level, two
asterisks denote significance at the 5% level and three asterisks
denote significance at the 1% level. Source: AREAER.
41
48
11
49
40
11
48
43
9
43
44
13
45
44
10
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
inflexible flexible other managed
Figure 1: Exchange Rate Regime Classifications (Percent of Total)
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Figure 2: Frequency of Exchange Rate Regime Transitions, 2009–2012
